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The Role of the Organized Bar in State
Judicial Selection Reform: The Year 2000
Standards
James J. Alfini* & Jarrett Gable**
I.

Introduction

Questions about the impact the judicial selection process has on the
quality and independence of the judiciary have become more salient of
late. Contests for judicial office in states with elective judiciaries are
increasingly contentious, resulting in constitutional challenges to ethical
restrictions on judicial campaign speech' and burgeoning war chests that
Professor, Northern Illinois University College of Law.
Assistant Public Defender, Chicago, Illinois. It was the privilege of the authors
to serve as Reporter and Assistant Reporter for the American Bar Association (ABA)
Commission on State Judicial Selection Standards [hereinafter ABA Commission on
Standards]. It is important to note at the outset that these Standards had their genesis
with the ABA Special, now Standing, Committee on Judicial Independence. The
Committee had proposed the creation of these Standards to the Open Society Institute of
the Soros Foundation and, as a result, received funding. We wish to thank John Kowal of
the Open Society Institute; the members of the ABA Commission on Standards, and
particularly its chair, Ned Madeira; the members of the Standing Committee on Judicial
Independence, then chaired by Alfred P. Carlton, now President-Elect of the ABA; and
Luke Bierman and Eileen Gallagher of the ABA.
1. The cases that challenge restrictions on judicial campaign speech generally
challenge provisions of Canon 5 of the 1990 version of the ABA Model Code of Judicial
Conduct or Canon 7 of the 1972 version. See Stretton v. Disciplinary Bd. of Supreme
Court, 944 F.2d 137 (3d Cir. 1991) (upholding constitutionality of "announce clause" of
Canon 7 of the Pennsylvania Code of Judicial Conduct, if narrowly construed); Buckley
v. Jud. Inquiry Bd., 997 F.2d 224 (7th Cir. 1993) (finding Illinois rule regarding Canon
7(B)(1)(c) was unconstitutionally overbroad because it prohibits all discussions of a
candidate's views); Republican Party v. Kelly, 247 F.3d 854 (8th Circ. 2001) (affirming
district court's decision that the "announce" clause in Canon 5 of the Minnesota Code of
Judicial Conduct, if narrowly construed, was constitutional), rev'd, 122 S. Ct. 2528
(2002); Pittman v. Cole, 117 F. Supp. 2d 1285 (S.D. Ala. 2000) (enjoining the Alabama
Judicial Conduct Commission from enforcing two advisory opinions that advised judicial
candidates not to answer a questionnaire from the Christian Coalition); Beshear v. Butt,
773 F. Supp. 1229 (E.D. Ark. 1991) (finding that the Arkansas Code of Judicial Canon
7(B)(1)(c) was unconstitutionally overbroad, and a violation of the First Amendment,
where it restricted a judicial candidate from expressing his views on disputed legal or
*

**
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finance judicial election campaigns. 2 Many fear that the ultimate effect
of allowing unrestricted campaign speech and increased campaign fundraising in judicial elections is erosion of the independence of the
judiciary. That is, as judges become more identified with certain
interests and issues pre-election, public confidence in unbiased decisions
wanes.
The purpose of this article is to present the Standards on State
Judicial Selection (Standards), 3 which are intended to address this
problem. The American Bar Association (ABA) Standing Committee on
Judicial Independence established the Commission on State Judicial
Selection Standards (Commission) in 1999. The Commission was
comprised of representatives of various groups associated with state
judicial selection reform.4 The methods used by the members to develop
the Standards included an assessment of the literature on state judicial
selection and interviews with those involved and interested in the
selection process. The ABA House of Delegates approved the Standards
in 2000.'
Part II of this article places the Standards in historical context by
discussing the history of the American Bar Association's role in judicial
selection reform.6 An analysis of the Standards is the main focus in Part
III, focusing on the Judicial Eligibility Commission, a body unique to the
Standards.7
II.

State Judicial Selection Reform and the American Bar Association

From the onset, bar associations have been committed to
establishing and maintaining an independent and just judiciary, that is,
judicial selection reform. 8 In 1878, the American Bar Association was
political issues); In re Chmura, 608 N.W.2d 31 (Mich. 2000) (finding Michigan Code of
Judicial Conduct Canon 7(B)(1)(d) unconstitutional on First Amendment grounds in
judicial discipline case revising the canon to narrow the language dealing with false
public communications, and remanding for application of the new language to the case),
remanded to 626 N.W.2d 876 (Mich. 2001) (noting unanimous approval of the revision
of the standard for falsity under Canon 7(B)(1)(d) but with two justices dissenting as to
its application in this case).
2. See, e.g., David Barnhizer, "On the Make": Campaign Funding and the
Corruptionof the American Judiciary, 50 CATH. U. L. REv. 361 (2001).
3.

STANDARDS ON STATE JUDICIAL SELECTION (2000) [hereinafter Standards]. Am.

Bar Ass'n, American Bar Association House of Delegates Approves Standardsfor State
Judicial Selection (Aug. 16, 2000), available at http://www.abanet.org/media/aug00
/standards.html. The Standards are contained in the Appendix to this article.
4. A list of members of the ABA Commission on Standards is contained in the
Appendix to this article.
5. Am. Bar Ass'n, supra note 3.
6. See infra Part II.
7. See infra Part III.
8. It is interesting to note that the first recognized modem bar association, the Bar
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formed to improve the administration of justice in the United States.9 In
order for the interests of the legal community to be best served, bar
associations knew it was imperative for the judiciary to have a reputation
for being objective and free from political influences.
Prior to the "official" establishment of bar associations, a variety of
judicial selection methods had been utilized. Before the American
Revolution, the king of England chose all judges in the American
colonies.' 0 Following independence, states' methods for choosing judges
reflected an effort to distribute the selection responsibility to more than
one individual. Most state legislatures accomplished this by delegating
to themselves the power to select the judiciary." While these early state
judicial selection methods represented a shift from a selection process
subject to the will of a single individual, they still fell under the broad
category of appointive selection methods, legislative appointment and
gubernatorial appointment.
By the 1830s, the United States entered a period of egalitarian
democracy, often referred to as the "Age of Jackson" because it
coincided with the presidency of Andrew Jackson. 12 Jacksonian
democracy was founded on the ideal that all men were considered equal,13
and, thus, no special training was required to assume public office.
This ideology brought vast changes to judicial selection methodology
between 1830 and 1860.14 Beginning in 1847, almost all of New York
of the City of New York (established 1870), was established in response to dissatisfaction
among the legal community of Boss Tweed's control of the judiciary. See RICHARD A.
WATSON & RONDAL G. DOWNING, THE POLITICS OF THE BENCH AND THE BAR 7-8 (1969)

(citing ROSCOE POUND, THE LAWYER FROM ANTIQUITY TO MODERN TIMES ch. IX (1953)).
9. See id. at 7.
10. Under the English model, the king selected each judge and could withdraw a
judge for any reason. This practice led to a belief that the judiciary was simply an
extension of the monarchy, and thus contributed to the repression, either real or
perceived, in the colonies. Indeed, the Declaration of Independence itself cites the
dissatisfaction of this practice in the minds of its writers. See THE DECLARATION OF
INDEPENDENCE para. 11 (U.S. 1776) ("[The King] has made Judges dependent upon his
Will alone, for the Tenure of their offices, and the Amount and Payment of their
salaries.").
11. Seven states used solely a legislative appointment method, while five states
resorted to appointment by the governor and a council. Glenn R. Winters, Selection of
Judges-An HistoricalIntroduction, 44 TEX. L. REV. 1081, 1082 (1966). The final state
combined both methods. See id. Additionally, at least one authority has noted that
Georgia was an exception to this rule by employing popular elections for superior court
judges in 1777. George E. Brand, Speech at the Meeting of the Bar of Nebraska (Oct. 19,
1950), in NEB. ST. BAR ASSOC. PROCEEDINGS, 1950, at 196 (1950).
12. For an excellent history of this time period and judicial selection, see EVAN
HAYNES, SELECTION AND TENURE OF JUDGES 80-100 (1944).

13.

See Dorothy W. Nelson, Variationson a Theme, Selection and Tenure of Judges,

36 S. CAL. L. REV. 4, 15-16 (1962).

14. For an in-depth review of various judicial selection methods during this period,
see HAYNES, supra note 12, at 10 1-35. See also Kermit L. Hall, The Judiciaryon Trial:
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state judges were selected through popular election. 15 Within ten years
from New York's shift, more than half of the existing states employed
election-based methods for filling judicial offices. 16 Interestingly, the
United States was a rare exception to the generally used appointive
methods employed throughout the world. However, the new elective
method was not necessarily driven by a desire to improve the quality of
the judiciary, but, instead, by a movement towards the democratization

of government. 17
Following the Civil War, discontent with judicial elections
increased. 18 In many big cities, the selection of judges tended to be
controlled by the dominant political party. 19 As Charles H. Sheldon and
Linda S. Maule note:
Of course, popular election of judges soon meant partisan elections.
Party lists ballots and partisan slates permitted voters to mark the
ballot once to cast a vote for all party candidates, including judges,
and, in effect, making parties responsible for recruiting judges.
Political party conventions nominated judges and party loyalists
elected them. Unfortunately, cronyism, payment of political debts,
and political trading permeated much of the judicial selection
20
process.
With the transformation from appointment to elective systems, the
judicial selection process might have freed itself from the image that
only men of privilege could obtain judgeships. 2 1 But now the public's
State Constitutional Reform and the Rise of an Elected Judiciary 1846-1860, 46 THE
HISTORIAN 337 (1983).

15. Previously, the governor with consent of the senate had selected the judiciary.
See Haynes, supra note 12, at 123.
16. Seeid. at 101-35.
17. See Winters, supra note 11, at 1082 ("There had never been an elected judiciary,
but with the new concept of sovereignty in the populace as a whole, it was inevitable that
someone would propose popular election ofjudges, since governors and legislatures were
already being elected. This was not particularly designed for improving justice but was
simply another manifestation of the populism movement."), see also Haynes, supra note
12, at 100 ("It seems reasonable to say that the fundamental causes of that change had
very little to do with the relative merits of this or that system of judicial selection and
tenure, but were rather the ideas and impulses of a violent swing toward the
democratization of government generally.").
18. See WATSON & DOWNING, supra note 8, at 9.
19. In the 1860s, the Tammany Hall organization controlled the New York City
judiciary and had a reputation for removing competent judges from office and replacing
them with political party loyalists. See id.; Winters, supra note 11, at 1083.
20. See CHARLES H. SHELDON & LINDA S. MAULE, CHOOSING JUSTICE: THE
RECRUITMENT OF STATE AND FEDERAL JUDGES 5 (1997).
21. See Winters, supra note 11, at 1082 (quoting WILLIAM S. CARPENTER, JUDICIAL

TENURE IN THE UNITED STATES 173-174 (1918)) (stating that "there is some indication

that [early judicial selection] was inspired in part by a feeling that judges were being
appointed too frequently from the ranks of the wealthy and the privileged").
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perception that judicial candidates were too involved in politics to be
objective arbiters of the truth became prevalent. In response to this
dissatisfaction with the elective methodology, three separate movements
arose: modem organized bar associations were established; non-partisan
election reforms were attempted in states entering the union during the
latter part of the nineteenth century; and, after the turn of the twentieth
century, a new selection process that would become known as "merit
selection" was born.
It is no coincidence that modem organized bar associations were
born during a time when the judiciary was reputed to be under the
control of various political party bosses.22 The "spoils system" of the
Jacksonian Revolution had resulted in a political climate in many urban
areas where political party "machines" could control entire city
operations through patronage. Judgeships were an important source of
patronage and, as a result, subject to the control and influence of political
party bosses. This state of affairs was unacceptable to many lawyers and
spurred the establishment of bar associations with the announced goal of
"[improving] the administration of justice. 23
From their founding to the present day, bar associations have
employed two principal means for improving and maintaining a qualified
and independent judiciary. First, bar associations in elective jurisdictions
generally have evaluated the qualifications of judicial candidates.2 4
22. It was in the best interests of the legal profession to take an interest in judicial
selection reform for the benefit of the profession itself. But see SHELDON & MAULE,
supra note 20, at 5 ("The Progressive Movement gained a hold on politics with reforms
like initiative, referendum and recall, primary elections, administration regulation, and
non-partisanship. Coincidentally, the legal profession organized at the national but more
importantly at the state level, to further the interests of lawyers. This interest led to the
recruitment of judges.").

23. See WATSON & DOWNING, supra note 8, at 7 ("Lawyer resentment over Boss
Tweed's control of the courts led to the establishment of the first modem bar association:
the Bar of the City of New York, in 1870. Within the decade that followed, a number of
similar associations, including the ABA, were formed to improve the administration of
justice in the United States."); see also A.B.A. CONST. art. 1,§ 1.1-.2. ("This Association
shall be known as the 'American Bar Association.' The purposes of the Association are
to... advance the science of jurisprudence; to promote throughout the nation the
administration of justice and uniformity of legislation and of judicial decisions; to uphold
the honor of the profession of law; ... to encourage cordial intercourse among the
members of the American bar.").
24. See, e.g., JAMES H. GUTERMAN & ERROL E. MEIDINGER, IN THE OPINION OF THE
BAR: A NATIONAL SURVEY OF BAR POLLING PRACTICES (1977).

The ABA has evaluated

candidates for the federal bench since the Eisenhower administration. See SHELDON &
MAULE, supra note 20, at 153. However, this practice has changed during the Bush II
administration from a pre-nomination evaluation to a post-nomination evaluation. See
generally Letter from Alberto Gonzales, Counsel to President George W. Bush, to
Martha W. Barnett, President, ABA (Mar. 22, 2001) (regarding the proposed termination
of this practice), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/03/2001
0322-5.html.
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Second, bar associations
have advocated reforms within judicial
25
systems.
selection
Early judicial reform efforts by the bar generally attempted to shield
judicial candidates from political pressures by altering the electoral
6
process (e.g., nonpartisan judicial ballots, separate judicial elections).,27
In addition, the bar itself also began to evaluate judicial candidates.
The results of bar associations' own evaluations were then made public
in hopes of educating the citizenry prior to a judicial election.28
However, these early bar association efforts led to little change in the
makeup of the bench. Richard A. Watson and Rondal G. Downing
observe: "However, neither strategy was successful, since political party
leaders continued to operate effectively no matter which type of judicial
election method was employed, and the voters took their cues in judicial
elections
from political party leaders rather than from the organized
9
,2

bar."

By the turn of the new century, even though bar associations had
succeeded in organizing at local, state and national levels, the state of
judicial selection was still unsatisfactory in the eyes of the legal
establishment. It was within this environment that two ideas were
developed in the hopes of improving judicial selection-non-partisan
judicial elections and merit selection.
In the early part of the twentieth century, the idea of non-partisan
judicial elections, although not new, gained momentum. 30 By removing
from the ballot the political affiliation of judicial candidates, legal
reformers hoped to de-politicize the selection system. 31 This type of
judicial selection was mostly attempted by the newer states located in the
midwest and northwest regions. 32 But non-partisan judicial elections
were a disappointment to the organized bar because they failed to bring
25. The ABA has played an integral part in judicial selection reform. Recently, the
ABA published standards related to financing judicial election campaigns and state
judicial selection.
26. Watson and Downing discuss the use of separate judicial nominating
conventions, nonpartisan ballots, direct primaries and separate judicial elections. See
WATSON & DOWNING, supra note 8, at 8.
27. See id.
28. Numerous Bar associations continue this practice today. See supra note 24.
29. WATSON & DOwNING, supra note 8, at 8.
30. See Winters, supra note 11, at 1083.
31. See SHELDON & MAULE, supra note 20, at 5 (writing, "[f]or the lawyers, the hope
was that as political parties were removed from the election of judges, bar associations
would be drawn into the vacuum").
32. To this day, the effects of this movement are evidenced by the continued use of
non-partisan judicial elections for some or all judicial candidates in Idaho, Kentucky,
Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, Nevada, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon,
Washington, and Wisconsin (information regarding individual state judicial selection
methods are available at http://www.ajs.org/selectl l.html).

2002]ROLE

OF THE ORGANIZED BAR IN STATE JUDICIAL SELECTION REFORM

689

the kind of changes for which much of the organized bar had hoped.
Political parties still found ways to influence the selection process, voters
often knew even less about judicial candidates, and the issue of campaign
financing still raised questions about the independence of the bench.
The tide began to turn in favor of a merit-based selection system in
1906 when Roscoe Pound gave his now-famous speech at the annual
meeting of the American Bar Association.33 Pound, a young professor at
the University of Nebraska and later a founding member of the American
Judicature Society (AJS), 34 argued that the widespread use of popular
elections negatively affected the reputation of the bench, by adversely
politicizing the process. Next, in 1913, ex-President William Howard
Taft declared in an address to the ABA that non-partisan judicial
elections were not the35 answer to the inherent problems associated with
electing the judiciary.
Also in 1913, the AJS was founded specifically to address the issues
of judicial selection, tenure and retirement of judges.36 Soon after,
Albert M. Kales, also a founding member of the AJS, devised a new
procedure for selecting judges that combined elements of the elective
plan and the appointive plan, but with a new variation: a nominating
commission. 37 During the next few decades, the Kales plan would
evolve into three main parts.
First, a nonpolitical nominating
commission would select judicial candidates based on the candidates'
competency for office. Second, an appointing authority, that is, a chief
judge or other official, would choose one of the candidates from the
submitted list and appoint the person to the judicial vacancy. Finally, the
newly appointed judge would run in a noncompetitive, nonpartisan
retention election after serving a set term on the bench.
The Kales plan, later renamed the "merit plan" or "merit selection,"
was well received by those involved with judicial selection reform.3 8
Getting the public and lawyers to back this reform, however, was a
different matter. George E. Brand was later to describe the situation as
follows: "Except, however, for the journalistic support of the American

33. Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction With the Administration
of Justice (pt. 1), 29 A.B.A. Rep. 305 (1906), reprintedin 20 J. AM. JUD. Soc. 178-186

(1937).
34. See Winters, supra note 11, at 1083.
35. See ALLAN ASHMAN & JAMES J.ALFINI,

THE KEY TO JUDICIAL MERIT SELECTION:

THE NOMINATING COMMISSION 10 (1974).
36. See id. at 11.
37. The Kales Plan first proposed the idea of a nonpolitical nominating commission,
although it was generally referred to as a "council." See SHELDON & MAULE, supra note
20, at 126.
38. See Winters, supra note 11, at 1084 (stating that the Kales plan was quickly
promoted by the American Judicature Society).
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Judicature Society, movement for change, though widespread, lacked
national organizational sponsorship and support. Bar association activity
or support, if any, on local and state levels was usually minimized by
aggressive dissent by many lawyers."'3 9
In 1926, Kales and fellow English scholar Harold Laski altered the
Kales Plan slightly to allow for a governor to act as the appointing
authority. In 1934, California become the first state to utilize retention
elections as a way to shield judges from political pressures associated
with competitive judicial elections.40
While the notion of "merit selection" for judges was developing, the
ABA was also moving to address the concerns raised by the election
system. In 1916, the ABA held a conference for state and local bar
associations to address problems in the profession.' One authority states
42
that the issue of judicial selection was listed as an important concern.
Later, in 1930, the ABA established the committee of the Conference of
Bar Association Delegates on Judicial Selection.43
Little change in judicial selection appears to have come from the
ABA's efforts until 1933, when the ABA formed the National Bar
Program (NBP) in order to coordinate the efforts of various state and
local bar associations. 44 The NBP represented the first large-scale,
national attempt to organize regional bar associations for the purpose of
45
concentrating on four specific issues related to the profession.
"Selection of Judges" was chosen as one of four primary areas of study
for the newly created NBP.46 Another special committee of the ABA,
the Committee on Judicial Selection and Tenure, was created in 1936. 7
The ABA's reform activities in the 1930s culminated in the
adoption by the ABA House of Delegates of what would become known
as the "American Bar Association Plan" in 1937. 48 The ABA Plan was
39. Brand, supra note 11, at 197.
40. See Joseph R. Grodin, Developing a Consensus of Constraint: A Judge's
Perspective on JudicialRetention Elections, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 1969, 1972 (1988).
41. SeeBrand, supranote 11, at 198.
42. Id.
43. See EDSON R. SUNDERLAND, HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION AND
ITS WORK 137 (1953) (citing 55 A.B.A. REP. XIX (1930)).
44. See Brand, supra note 11, at 198.
45. Representatives from over eighty state and local bar associations were present
for the NBP's founding. "In outline the plan involved the selection of four subjects or
problems of importance to the profession upon which a community of effort by all
cooperating associations was invited." See SUNDERLAND, supra note 44, at 93-94.
46. Id. at 94.
47. Id. at 137.
48. The ABA Plan set forth that the filling of vacancies by appointment by the state
executive or other elected official or officials from a list named by another agency,
composed in part of high judicial officers and in part of other citizens selected for that
purpose. 62 A.B.A. REP. 893(a) (1937). If further checks are desired, it would be by the
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modeled after the Kales-Laski merit selection system and was put forth
to assist state and local bar associations in their judicial reform efforts.4 9
Later, the plan would also become known as the "Nonpartisan Court
Plan."
In 1940, Missouri became the first state to adopt a Nonpartisan
Court Plan, or merit plan, similar to the ones created by the ABA and the
American Judicature Society. 50 At least part of the credit for Missouri's
becoming the first state to adopt a merit plan belongs to the St. Louis Bar
Association and its work with the Missouri State Bar Association and the
Lawyer's Association of Kansas City. 5' Ironically, other groups that
assisted in obtaining
the plan's approval did so by disassociating it with
52
Bar.
the organized
Since 1940, the ABA has continued its efforts to encourage the
adoption of merit selection plans. At present, fifteen states and the
District of Columbia employ a merit plan as their primary judicial
selection method, nine additional states combine a merit plan with other
selection methods, and ten more states utilize such a plan to fill interim
judicial vacancies occurring between elections.53 Although the merit
plan continues to be the centerpiece for judicial reform efforts, there have
been reports that it can be abused or misused by political forces.54
III.

State Judicial Selection Standards and the ABA

The most recent judicial reform effort of the ABA is the adoption
and publication of the Standards on State Judicial Selection. 55 In
developing the Standards, the ABA Commission on Standards
(Commission) relied on two basic premises: first, that the basic selection
methods by the various state judiciaries would be accepted as a given,
and, second, that the Commission would work toward developing
standards that would maximize the independence of the judiciary
selected under each of the basic methods. With these two premises in
mind, the Commission focused its efforts on development of standards
that were intended to influence the behavior of critical actors in the
judicial selection process, rather than ones that would necessitate
requirement of confirmation by the senate or other legislative body. Id Then, after a
period of service, the appointee would periodically go before the people upon his record,
with the vote to being upon the question whether the appointee be retained in office. Id.
49. See Brand, supra note 11, at 198-99.
50. Since then the plan has also become known as the Missouri Plan. See Winters,
supra note 11, at 1084.
51. See WATSON & DOWNING, supra note 8, at 10.

52,

Id. at 11.

53.
54.
55.

PATRICIA A. GARCIA ROAD MAPS: JUDICIAL SELECTION 10 (1998).
See, e.g., ASHMAN & ALFINI, supra note 36, at 70-85.
See supra note 3.
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constitutional or statutory reform. Although one could argue that there
are as many as seven or eight basic selection methods presently in place
in the United States, the Commission honed in on the two predominant
methods: elective and appointive. Certain actors can play critical roles
regardless of the selection method (e.g., the judicial candidate, individual
lawyers, bar associations, citizen groups, and the media), while a few
actors are unique to a particular selection method for example, the
political party slate-makers in elective jurisdictions.
Therefore, the approach that the Commission initially adopted was
to develop separate sets of standards for each of the two predominant
selection methods, with subsets for each of the critical actors in the
judicial selection process. For example, there would be a subset of
standards for bar associations in both elective and appointive
jurisdictions. Some of these standards might apply to both of the basic
selection methods (e.g., standards relating to bar screening and candidate
interviewing), while others would be appropriate for only one of the
methods (e.g., campaign financing). Similarly, standards relating to how
nominees are brought to an appointing authority's attention in an
appointive jurisdiction might vary depending on who the appointing
official or body is or whether a merit plan is in place for all or some of
the courts.
Such an approach allowed the Commission to develop distinct sets
of standards that are aimed at influencing the behavior of critical actors
in the judicial selection process. Because all sets of standards would
have as their goal the creation and preservation of an independent
judiciary, they might also have the effect of demonstrating that such a
goal is more easily attainable with a particular selection method. At its
initial meetings, the Commission identified the individuals and
organizations that play significant roles in the judicial selection process.
In the order that they appear in the Standards, they are:
* judicial nominating commissions,
" appointing officials and bodies,
" endorsing authorities (political party slate-makers),
" bar associations,
" judicial candidates,
" individual lawyers (who play varying roles such as campaign
committee chair, recommenders, donors, etc.),
" citizen groups, and
" the media.
While conducting research and holding hearings, the Commission
decided to add the retention evaluation bodies that have been used
successfully in a few jurisdictions.
It became clear to the Commision that those jurisdictions that were
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best able to achieve the goal of a "qualified, inclusive, and independent
judiciary" (a phrase that is used throughout the Standards) were those
that relied on a "credible, deliberative body" to review the qualifications
of judicial candidates pursuant to recognized selection criteria. In merit
selection jurisdictions, the nominating commission performs this
function, while, in other jurisdictions, it may be performed by bar
screening committees or special bodies such as the Commission of
Judicial Nominee Evaluation in California. As a result, the Commision
decided to include in the Standards a unique entity, the Judicial
Eligibility Commission (JEC). Standard B.1, the first of the standards
covering the primary actors in the selection process, covers the JEC. The
other primary actors are the Judicial Nominating Commission (JNC), the
Appointing Authority, the Endorsing Authority, and the Retention
Evaluation Body. Section B is preceded by a section devoted to Judicial
Selection and Retention Criteria and followed by standards covering
secondary actors in the selection process: bar associations, judicial
candidates, individual lawyers, public and private organizations and
media interests. In offering this tripartite set of Standards (selection
criteria, primary actors and secondary actors), the Committee makes it
clear that its sole goal is a qualified, inclusive and independent judiciary
that will ensure public confidence in our judicial system.
The uniqueness of the JEC in the Standards warrants additional
analysis. In simple terms, a JEC is a body composed of lawyers and
public members that assists appointing authorities, endorsing authorities,
and voters by evaluating the qualifications of candidates for judicial
office. Any jurisdiction, regardless of its basic judicial selection method,
that wishes to increase public confidence in an elected or appointed
judiciary might choose to experiment with a JEC.
A JEC operates in much the same way as a JNC, but with some
critical differences. Both commissions are state-funded, have lawyer and
public members, operate independently of other authorities, and are
charged with the goal of evaluating candidates for judicial office.
However, there are some basic differences that separate the two
commissions. A primary difference is their method of influence on
judicial selection. While a JNC selects a set number of judicial nominees
that are presented to the appointing authority, a JEC evaluates all judicial
candidates and produces a list of those who are found to be qualified.
Thus, a JEC could produce a list of up to 100 candidates if 100 qualified
individuals were seeking judicial office. Furthermore, after a list of
qualified candidates is produced, the candidates are placed on a ballot,
presented to a JNC, or presented to an endorsing or appointing authority
for further selection. There is no mandate that voices of the JEC be
heard. The JEC's evaluation of potential candidates serves primarily an
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educational purpose, to aid others in selecting the judiciary, whereas a
JNC's determinations must be followed. Another major difference is
that a JEC can be used to evaluate sitting judges facing retention or reelection.
In order to determine that a judicial candidate is qualified, the JEC
investigates, deliberates, and ultimately evaluates the qualifications of
each judicial candidate. Once a judicial candidate has received a
qualified rating, he or she is free to campaign for judicial office with the
knowledge that a credible, independent and deliberative body has found
him or her qualified to be a judge. The list of qualified candidates can be
presented to those responsible for the final selection of the judiciary, be
they governors, legislatures, nominating commissions, or voters.
Does a JEC simply add another level of bureaucracy, particularly in
states using a JNC? No. If a state has an acceptable method of choosing
state judges, a JEC is unnecessary. Many argue that a nonpartisan court
plan (merit plan) state that utilizes a JNC and holds retention elections
already has an exemplary judicial selection process. These standards do
not seek to argue with, or burden, that contention. Indeed, the central
thesis of these Standards is that a JNC can and should serve as a credible,
deliberative body. A JEC, on the other hand, could be used in a state that
seeks to legitimate or improve upon its judicial selection process, even if
that state uses a JNC. Some JNC states may view the JEC as an
opportunity to streamline, rather than to bureaucratize, the judicial
selection process, by having the JEC assist in the JNC's screening
function and evaluate the qualifications of sitting judges facing retention
elections. By employing a JEC, the benefits of increasing public
perception in the quality and integrity of the judiciary can outweigh the
risks of bureaucratizing judicial selection.
Although no state has yet used the precise form of JEC described in
these Standards, a handful of states have successfully used similar bodies
to assess the qualifications of judicial candidates. In Oklahoma, for
instance, a small state-sanctioned group successfully evaluated judges
facing retention elections. In California, the Commission of Judicial
Nominee Evaluation (JNE) operates in a very similar fashion to the
Judicial Eligibility Commission proposed. Still other states have had
success with Retention Evaluation Bodies, explained in Standard B.5.
Most recently, the AJS Chapter in Illinois has proposed a constitutional
amendment to create a Judicial Eligibility Commission after years of
frustration in trying to have a merit plan adopted in that state.
IV. Conclusion
The Standards on State Judicial Selection are very much in keeping
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with prior judicial reform efforts of the organized bar, particularly by
seeking to design selection processes that yield a highly qualified and
independent judiciary. However, the Standards are unique in at least two
respects. First, they address all critical actors or entities that play a role
in the judicial selection process. Second, the Standards create a new
entity, the Judicial Eligibility Commission. It remains to be seen
whether the Judicial Eligibility Commission will become the centerpiece
for judicial reform efforts during the twenty first century that the
Judicial
56
Nominating Commission (merit plan) was during the twentieth.

56. For an interesting analysis of the appeal of merit judicial selection and a proposal
for credentialing a pool of judicial candidates, see Luke Bierman, Beyond Merit
Selection, 29 FORDHAM URBAN L.J. 851 (2002).
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Introduction
On July 11, 2000, the House of Delegates of the American Bar
Association ("ABA") adopted a Resolution approving the "black letter"
Standards for State Judicial Selection and, as such, the Standards become
policy of the ABA. This report which sets forth the background and
rationale for the Standards, as well as commentary to the Standards, is
prepared by the Commission on State Judicial Selection Standards of the
ABA's Standing Committee on Judicial Independence. Only the "black
letter" Standards constitute ABA policy.
The Commission and Its Charge
In 1999, the American Bar Association Standing Committee on
Judicial Independence established a Commission on State Judicial
Selection Standards. The charge to the Commission was to draft model
standards for selection of state court judges. The work of the
Commission was funded by a generous grant from the Open Society
Institute. The Commission held public hearings on September 17, 1999,
in Denver, Colorado, and on November 19, 1999, in Raleigh, North
Carolina. The following testified before the Commission:
Robert Darcy, Oklahoma Judicial Evaluation Commission,
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma
R. Bruce Dold, Deputy Editorial Page Editor, Chicago Tribune,
Chicago, Illinois
Senator Robert Duncan, Texas State Senator, Lubbock, Texas
Governor John Gilligan, Former Governor of Ohio, Cincinnati,
Ohio
Sandra Otaka, Member, Board of Directors, Asian American Bar
Association of the Greater Chicago Area, Chicago, Illinois
Douglas Phillips, Former Member, Colorado Judicial Nomination
Commission, Denver, Colorado
Burt Pines, Judicial Appointments Secretary to California Governor
Gray Davis, Sacramento, California
Harold Pope, President, National Bar Association, Detroit,
Michigan
Hon. Frederic Rodgers, Past Chair, ABA Judicial Division, Golden,
Colorado
George Soule, Chair, Minnesota Commission on Judicial Selection,
Minneapolis, Minnesota
Richard Taylor, North Carolina Trial Lawyers Association, Raleigh,
North Carolina
William Taylor, Counsel to the Joint Interim Judiciary Committee,
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Oregon Legislative Assembly, Salem, Oregon
Michael Valdez, Colorado Bar Association, Director of Legislative
Relations, Denver, Colorado
Transcripts of the hearings are available from the Standing
Committee on Judicial Independence.
The reporters provided the Commission members with extensive
materials on judicial selection, as well as interviewed a variety of
individuals with a special interest in the methodology of judicial
selection. The members met in person, as well as by telephone
conference call, on several occasions. The proposed Standards were
widely distributed to various ABA sections and entities, as well as other
interested organizations, with the request for comments. Valuable
assistance was received from a task force of the Litigation Section,
chaired by Carolyn Lamm of Washington, DC, and Ronald Breaux of
Dallas, Texas. There was broad support for the Standards and they were
adopted by the ABA House of Delegates without opposition on July 11,
2000.
The Commission further wishes to express its gratitude for the
generous assistance of the following, without whom the task would have
been much more difficult: Senator Michael F. Feeley, Heidi Horvath,
Michael Carrigan, Allan Head, William Scoggin, and Becky Blakenship.
The Standards and Commentary
Rationale
Disagreement over the best method of selecting a qualified judiciary
has existed since the founding of the United States, and has resulted in a
variety of selection methods. Although direct appointment by the chief
executive or by the legislature were the methods chosen by the original
thirteen states, at various times during our history other means of
selecting judges have been preferred.
At present, there are widely varying methods for selection of state
court judges in the 50 states. A brief history of judicial selection
methodologies is included as App. 2 to this report. In many states, most
judges continue to reach the bench initially through direct appointment
by the chief executive or the legislature. In some of these states, the
judges are appointed after being nominated to the appointing authority by
a commission of lawyers and persons who are not lawyers. In yet other
states, judges come to office after successfully running in an election that
may be either partisan or non-partisan. In many states different selection
methods are used for the trial and appellate judiciaries or for trial judges
in different geographic areas. Additionally, a large percentage of state
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judges initially reach the bench through an interim appointment process,
even in states that elect judges.
The ABA has supported and continues to support a merit-based
appointive system for judicial selection known as merit selection. These
Standards are intended to be consistent with that system and should not
be viewed as a retreat from the ABA's support for merit selection.
Rather, the Standards may be viewed as a waypoint in the transition
towards such a system.
There is a two-part thesis for our recommended standards. First,
whatever the system for selection of state trial and appellate judges, there
is an implied covenant with the people that the judges selected will be
persons who have demonstrated by well-defined and well-recognized
qualifications their fitness for judicial office.
Second, there should be a credible, deliberative body that, pursuant
to published criteria and procedures, finds that persons considered for
judicial office are qualified, by learning, experience and temperament, to
decide the cases that come before them impartially and in accordance
with the law. The credibility of this body is crucial and the components
of credibility include: a method of appointing members to the body that
transcends political partisanship; assurance of an appropriate balance of
lawyer and non-lawyer members; assurance of bi-partisan, or nonpartisan, determinations by providing for a balanced representation
among the members of the major political parties; a membership that
reflects the geographical, racial, ethnic and gender diversity of the
jurisdiction; published criteria and procedures by which determinations
of qualifications are made; and assurance that the deliberative body will
be independent, such as provisions for staggered terms and an adequate
budget.
The standards are premised on the notion that the most important
constituency to be served by a judicial selection method is the American
public. The public is the ultimate consumer of judicial services and is
best served by a judicial selection process that is informed by and utilizes
the expertise of certain key actors. The critical actors in the judicial
selection process who are identified by these Standards are responsible
to, representative of, or interact with the American public in varying
ways. These actors have been divided into primary and supporting
actors.
The four primary actors are the: Appointing Authority, Endorsing
Authority, Judicial Nominating Commission, and Judicial Eligibility
Commission. The Appointing Authority is generally the governor of a
state and is thus accountable to the public through the ballot box for his
or her choices in selecting judges. The EndorsingAuthority is generally
a political party that endorses candidates and similarly derives its
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legitimacy from the public through the electoral process. Judicial
Nominating Commissions exist in various forms in several states,
generally providing the appointing authority with a list of names found to
be qualified for the particular judicial office. Depending upon its
composition, procedures and criteria, a nominating commission may or
may not constitute a "credible, deliberative body." Where there is no
existing credible, deliberative body, we recommend a JudicialEligibility
Commission which should be broadly representative of the public. It
would review the qualifications of candidates and advise appointing
authorities, endorsing authorities or where appropriate the electorate on
the results of its deliberations. In those states where sitting judges face
retention or other election, an additional primary actor can be the
Retention Evaluation Body, which may conduct evaluations of the
performance of these judges and provide reports to the electorate as to
their qualifications for continuing in office. A Judicial Eligibility
Commission may perform that evaluation and reporting function.
Of the primary actors, the Judicial Eligibility Commission is the
most original. Unlike the others, the Eligibility Commission has no
known counter-part in U.S. jurisdictions. Such a commission described
herein can play an important role in either appointive or elective
jurisdictions. As a credible, deliberative body, it may be provided for in
different ways, for example, by amendment of the state constitution,
legislative enactment, or executive order.
The Judicial Eligibility Commission (or a judicial nominating
commission where in fact it is a "credible, deliberative body") is
intended to promote a quality judiciary, to provide public accountability
and encourage judicial independence. By reviewing and evaluating
qualifications of judicial aspirants, the Commission makes an important
contribution in ensuring a qualified judiciary, regardless of selection
method. As a body representative of the community, the Commission
ensures public participation in the selection process and encourages
dissemination of information about judicial nominees, which provides
judicial accountability. This citizen involvement and awareness, coupled
with a deliberative assessment of the qualifications of judicial aspirants,
will protect judicial independence. Accordingly, the Commission strikes
an essential accommodation among the multiple goals of judicial quality,
judicial accountability and judicial independence.
The supporting actors include Bar Associations, Judicial
Candidates,Individual Attorneys, Public and Private Organizationsand
Media Interests. Although the influence of these supporting actors on
the judicial selection process may be less direct than that of the primary
actors, in many instances it may be critically important. Therefore, the
Standards that follow call for a judicial selection process that is informed
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by the expertise of all of these key actors and calls upon these key actors
to conduct themselves in ways that are consistent5 9with the overall goal of
a qualified, inclusive, and independentjudiciary.
Terminology
Appointing authority. An appointing authority is either an
individual (e.g. the governor of a state) or a body (e.g. a state
legislature or state supreme court) that has the ultimate authority to
appoint an individual to judicial office. See StandardB.3.
Candidate. A person seeking judicial office through either
appointment or election.
Endorsing authority. An endorsing authority is either an
individual (e.g. a political party official) or a body (e.g. a political
party slate-making committee) that plays a key gatekeeping role in
endorsing a judicial candidate to fill a judicial vacancy through
either a partisan or nonpartisan election. See StandardB.4.
Inclusive judiciary. A judiciary that includes individuals who
are broadly representative of the population served.
Independent judiciary. Denotes an impartial judiciary that is
free from inappropriate outside influences when deciding cases, and
from inappropriate influences from other governmental entities
when dealing with institutional matters.
Judicial eligibility commission. A judicial eligibility commission
is a bi-partisan body of lawyers and public members that assists
appointing authorities, endorsing authorities, and voters by
evaluating the qualifications of candidates for judicial office. See
StandardB. 1.
Judicial nominating commission.
A judicial nominating
commission is a bi-partisan body of lawyers and public members
that independently generates, screens and submits a list of judicial
nominees to an official who is legally or voluntarily bound to make a
selection from that list. See StandardB.2.
Open judicial selection process. A process in which the
appointing or endorsing authority seeks and encourages information
from a broad array of interested individuals and organizations.
Public member. A member of the public who is not a lawyer or
a member of a bar association, and serves on a judicial eligibility
commission or nominating commission.
Qualified judiciary. A judiciary selected on the basis of the
criteria set forth in Standard A.1 and is used herein to describe a
59.

These terms are defined in the following section.
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judiciary that is inclusive and independent.
Regularizedjudicial selection process. A process that proceeds
according to a customary or pre-announced plan.
Retention evaluation body. A retention evaluation body is a bipartisan body composed of lawyers and public members that
evaluates the performance of judges who must stand in retention
elections. See StandardB.5.
Part A: Judicial Selection and Retention Criteria.
Standard A.1: Selection Criteria. Judicial selection criteria
should include, but not necessarily be limited to:
(i) Experience. A candidate for judicial office should be a
member of the Bar of the highest court of a state for at least 10 years
and have been engaged in the practice or teaching of law, public
interest law, or service in the judicial system.
(ii) Integrity. The candidate should be of high moral character
and enjoy a general reputation in the community for honesty,
industry and diligence.
(iii) Professional Competence.
Professional competence
includes intellectual capacity, professional and personal judgment,
writing and analytical ability, knowledge of the law and breadth of
professional experience, including courtroom and trial experience.
Candidates for appellate judgeships should further demonstrate
scholarly writing and academic talent, and the ability to write to
develop a coherent body of law.
(iv) Judicial Temperament. Judicial temperament includes a
commitment to equal justice under law, freedom from bias, ability to
decide issues according to law, courtesy and civility, openmindedness and compassion.
(v) Service to the Law and Contribution to the Effective
Administration of Justice. Service to the law and contribution to the
effective administration of justice includes professionalism and a
commitment to improving the availability of providing justice to all
those within the jurisdiction.
Standard A.2: Retention Criteria. In addition to the criteria set
forth in Standard A.1, in evaluating the judicial performance of a
judge standing for retention election, the following should be
considered: preparation, attentiveness and control over judicial
proceedings; judicial management skills; courtesy to litigants,
counsel and court personnel; public disciplinary sanctions; and
quality of judicial opinions.
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Commentary
Literature on judicial selection is replete with lists of criteria that
should be considered in selecting a qualified judiciary. Although the
selecting authority may feel pressured to emphasize certain selection
criteria over others when making a particular appointment, the selecting
authority should endeavor to consider a broad range of criteria when
making an appointment. Depending on the nature of the judgeship,
additional consideration may be desirable. For example, courtroom or
trial experience may be especially pertinent for judgeships at the trial
level, while superior writing skills may be considered for appellate
judgeships. Additionally, the appellate record of a judge might be
considered. Studies of bar polling practices and the use of judicial
nominating commissions have revealed a broad range of criteria. Lists of
judicial selection criteria from a variety of sources are attached as an
appendix.
Disclosure of selection criteria is essential. Although this standard
prescribes no particular method for disclosure, the appointing authority
should implement a disclosure format that is reasonably consistent,
regularized, fair, and informative. Disclosure of selection criteria
familiarizes the citizenry with the judicial selection procedure, and thus
diminishes the perception of personal or political bias in the selection of
judges.
Additionally, disclosure of selection criteria encourages
qualified candidates to seek judicial office by informing them of the
qualities sought in a qualified judge.
Rules and procedures established by those responsible for assessing
the qualifications of judicial candidates may require a waiver of
confidentiality regarding disciplinary and legal proceedings concerning
the judicial candidate. Moreover, participation in continuing legal
education programs may be relevant when assessing judicial candidates,
and should therefore be considered.
Furthermore, a candidate's
experiences with regard to volunteering time for the improvement of the
legal system or the bettering of his or her community are also relevant.
Finally, when assessing the qualifications of a sitting judge, a candidate's
experiences with managing a caseload should be examined.
References
Patricia Garcia, Roadmaps: Judicial Selection (AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION, 1998).

American Bar Association Standing Committee on the Federal
Judiciary, StandardsRelated to FederalJudges.
Thomas E. Baker, The Good Judge (TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND,
1989).
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Part B: Primary Actors in Selection Process
Standard B.I: Judicial Eligibility Commission.
To assist
appointing authorities, endorsing authorities, and the electorate in
achieving the goal of a qualified, inclusive, and independent
judiciary, a credible, deliberative, bi-partisan body known as a
Judicial Eligibility Commission should be created to review the
qualifications of judicial candidates pursuant to recognized selection
criteria.
(a) Independence. The Judicial Eligibility Commission should
maintain its independence from all inappropriate influences,
particularly from appointing and endorsing authorities, and should
operate in a manner that instills public confidence and encourages
applicants from a broad range of personal and professional
backgrounds.
(b) Selection of Members and Commission Composition.
Members of the Judicial Eligibility Commission should be selected
by multiple sources, including, but not necessarily limited to,
governors, legislatures, supreme courts, and bar associations. The
Commission should be composed of both lawyer and public
members, and their selection should be based on the personal
qualities and integrity of the individual members.
(c) Open, Regularized, Confidential Process.
The Judicial
Eligibility Commission should establish rules and procedures for
evaluating candidates for judicial office. Additionally, the Eligibility
Commission should operate in an open, regularized fashion, while
respecting the candidate's desire for confidentiality.
(d) Screening and Recommendation of Candidates. A Judicial
Eligibility Commission should give careful and equal consideration
to each candidate for a judicial office, and should apply judicial
selection criteria set forth in Part A to determine whether a
candidate is qualified for judicial office. Only the names of those
candidates found qualified by the commission should be published
and placed on the list of qualified candidates and reported to the
appointing or endorsing authority.
(e) Commission Scope and Funding. The Judicial Eligibility
Commission should be established and funded on a statewide basis.
In larger or more populous states, regional commissions may be
established but should be funded and operate under the aegis of a
statewide commission.
Commentary
A Judicial Eligibility Commission is intended to be a credible,
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deliberative body that operates pursuant to a recognized set of criteria to
achieve the goal of a qualified, inclusive, and independent judiciary. No
person should come to the bench, or be retained in judicial office, unless
that person is found qualified by a Judicial Eligibility Commission or its
equivalent.
In a number of jurisdictions, the equivalent function is ably
performed by judicial nominating commissions that have been
established by state constitution, statute, or executive order. Where there
is an effective judicial nominating commission in place, operating
satisfactorily as credible, deliberative bodies, there is no need for a
Judicial Eligibility Commission.(see Standard B.2).
It is of paramount importance that Judicial Eligibility Commissions
should operate independently from other actors in the judicial selection
process. Much like nominating commissions, the primary purpose of a
Judicial Eligibility Commission is to assist appointing authorities,
endorsing authorities, and the electorate in the selection of a qualified,
inclusive, and independent judiciary. To facilitate this goal, a Judicial
Eligibility Commission must be an independent body that expresses
opinions about judicial candidates based on the commission's
independent findings. If the influence of politics colors its judgment, the
commission loses the confidence of the citizenry.
Establishing the credibility and independence of a Judicial
Eligibility Commission begins with the selection of commission
members. Although there is no rigid model, the selection of judicial
nominating commissioners is instructive. Like nominating commissions,
Eligibility Commissions should be composed of both lawyer and public
members. State bar associations typically choose lawyer members of
nominating commissions either through election or direct appointment by
bar leaders. Lawyer members are also chosen by state supreme courts in
some jurisdictions. Governors and legislative bodies typically select
public members. Thus, a core body of Commissioners might be selected
as follows:
-Governor selects two public members
-Legislature selects two public members
-Supreme Court selects two lawyer members
-Bar Association selects three lawyer members
Once this core group of nine commissioners is selected, a chair
should be appointed. The chair might be a current or former member of
the judiciary. In order to enhance the diversity of the commission, the
Governor may appoint a limited number of additional commissioners.
The chair should vote only to break a tie. In states where it may be
deemed necessary to augment the commission membership when filling
vacancies in certain geographic districts, two additional commissioners

2002]ROLE

OF THE ORGANIZED BAR IN STATE JUDICIAL SELECTION REFORM

709

might be added from the district, a public member selected by the
Governor and a lawyer member selected by the Supreme Court.
Commissioners may serve for no more than two three-year terms,
and the terms of commissioners should be staggered. Members of a
commission who would otherwise be eligible to hold judicial office
should not be a candidate for a judicial vacancy while they are members
of the commission or for four years following the end of their term on the
commission.
All aspirants for judicial office in elective and appointive
jurisdictions, including interim judicial appointments, should be required
to submit their names for review of their qualifications to the Judicial
Eligibility Commission. The candidates may submit their names either
on their own or through an endorsing or appointing authority. Individual
commissioners may also recruit candidates for judicial vacancies
pursuant to commission rules.
The commission should review the qualifications of candidates
carefully and fairly to determine whether they are "qualified" for the
particular judicial vacancy. The determination that a candidate is
"qualified" should be based on the use of recognized judicial selection
criteria. At a minimum, a candidate should not be rated "qualified"
unless the candidate is found to have demonstrated these criteria.
Where the Judicial Eligibility Commission is reviewing the
qualifications of sitting judges running for re-election or facing a
retention election, the commission should consider the additional criteria
listed in Standard A.2. In developing information on these candidates,
the commission should consider the experience of bodies charged with
the evaluation of judges facing retention elections (see Standard B.5). In
particular, bar associations and other groups that conduct surveys of
sitting judges should be consulted (see Standard C. 1, Standard C.4, and
Standard C.5). Surveys should be adequately funded to allow for a
sound evaluation process.
Only those candidates deemed "qualified" by the commission
should be placed on the list of candidates to be sent to the appointing or
endorsing authority.
The commission should adopt an initial set of rules and procedures
that govern its operations. These should be disseminated widely,
particularly to bar and media sources.
Judicial Eligibility Commissions should be established and funded
at the state level, with additional support from local governmental bodies
where regional commissions are established. The funding should be
sufficient to allow for adequate staffing and facilities.
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Standard B.2: Judicial Nominating Commission. In performing
its recruiting, screening, and nominating roles, a Judicial
Nominating Commission should operate in an open, regularized, and
independent manner that encourages applications from the widest
segment of the potential candidate pool and that employs a process
that fairly assesses all candidates by using a broad range of selection
criteria in an effort to achieve a qualified, inclusive, and independent
judiciary.
(a) Independence. A Judicial Nominating Commission should
maintain its independence from all inappropriate influences,
particularly from the appointing authority, and should operate in a
manner that instills public confidence and encourages applicants
from a broad range of personal and professional backgrounds.
(b) Selection of Members. Selection of members should be
based on the personal qualities and integrity of the individual, and
not a particular member's propensity to vote for particular judicial
candidates.
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(c) Open, Regularized. Confidential Process.
A Judicial
Nominating Commission should establish rules and procedures for
nominating candidates for judicial office. A Judicial Nominating
Commission should operate in an open, regularized fashion that also
respects the candidate's desire for confidentiality.
(d) Recruitment of Candidates.
Nominating commissions
should actively recruit qualified individuals for judgeships and in
performing this function should operate in a manner that imparts
public confidence in the judicial selection system, and encourages a
broad range of applicants.
(e) Screening and Deliberation of Candidates. A Judicial
Nominating Commission should give careful and equal attention to
each candidate for a judicial office, and should apply selection
criteria set forth in Part A in an effort to produce a qualified,
inclusive, and independent judiciary.
(f) Communication With Appointing Authority. A member of a
Judicial Nominating Commission should not initiate contact with the
appointing authority while serving on a nominating commission.
Commentary
Judicial Nominating Commissions serve a unique function. They
are responsible for the nomination of judicial candidates in Nonpartisan
Court Plan jurisdictions (also referred to as Missouri Plan or Merit Plan
jurisdictions). Their role places them in the position of nominating
individuals for judgeships. Thus, members of Judicial Nominating
Commissions hold positions of public trust and should conduct
themselves in a manner that reflects highly upon the judicial selection
process. Whenever feasible the citizenry should be informed, updated,
and included in the nomination process.
Among the states, nominating commissions vary in their structure,
composition and organization. Some states use one commission to select
all judges, while other states use separate commissions for different
judicial levels or separate commissions in different geographical areas.
Typically, nominating commissions include an even number of lawyers
and persons who are not lawyers. Often the commission will also
include a single judge who usually cannot participate in voting, but can
be of assistance in the procedural process. The state chief executive
branch official usually selects lay commissioners.
Lawyer
commissioners are normally selected by either the chief executive branch
official, bar association leaders, state attorneys general, state supreme
court judges, or a combination of the aforementioned. Some states
require legislative approval of some or all of the commission members.
Independence is essential to the successful operation of a Judicial
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Nominating Commission. Independence in this instance means the
freedom to recruit, screen, and nominate judicial candidates as the
commission sees fit, apart from undue influences stemming from
political, personal, social, or business considerations. Undue influence is
a dominating inclination to nominate based on criteria other than those
related to judicial ability, judicial independence, and judiciary
representation.
Nominating commissions should respect the value of an
independent judiciary. At various times, commissioners may be unduly
influenced by political or personal considerations that compromise the
objectivity and fairness of the nomination process. Thus, commissioners
should endeavor to reduce all undue influences based on a judicial
candidate's political affiliations, an appointing authority's political
agenda, or the commissioner's own political affiliations.
If a
commissioner, other commissioners, or a judicial candidate believes a
commissioner's independence may be unduly compromised by
influences associated with a general conflict of interest or an appearance
of impropriety, the affected commissioner should consider removing
him/herself from involvement in the selection of nominees for a
particular vacancy.
Commissions should operate in an open, regularized, independent
manner that is sensitive to the need of the public for information on
judicial candidates, while also respecting a candidate's desire for
confidentiality concerning his/her personal information. Nominating
commissions are responsible for investigating the personal and
professional lives of the judicial candidates. Due to the sensitive nature
of such information, individuals may be apprehensive about applying for
judgeships. In an effort to reduce the fear candidates may have of
exposing their private histories, commissioners should keep candidate
information confidential. In some cases, commissions may even decide
to keep the names of applicants anonymous. However, rules and
procedures may require a waiver of confidentiality regarding disciplinary
and legal proceedings concerning the judicial candidate.
Normally, each commission will select a chairperson. Usually this
person is a state judge (generally a non-voting member of the
commission), a voting committee member selected by the commission,
or a rotating committee chairperson. The chairperson is usually the
commission spokesperson. The spokesperson is the "outside voice" of
the commission for purposes of communicating with media outlets, the
citizenry, the candidates, and the appointing authority. Selecting a single
person to represent the commission legitimizes the commission, and
lessens the potential for disbursement of misinformation or unethical
communications.
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It is an accepted and unfortunate fact that all too often qualified
judicial candidates will not actively seek judgeships. Hence, state law
permitting, commissioners should actively seek out and encourage
qualified individuals to apply. If the recruitment of a qualified individual
jeopardizes the impartiality of a particular commissioner, the respective
commissioner should be disqualified from either participating or voting
and encourage the potential candidate to apply nevertheless.
To assist the recruitment process, these standards encourage the use
of a published notice of judicial vacancy. The recruitment process
should reflect the goal of achieving a qualified, inclusive and
independent judiciary.

The screening and investigation process can vary greatly between
jurisdictions.
Part A addresses selection criteria and should be consulted. A
commission should endeavor to design a selection system that is
objective and fair. Particularly, a commission should be mindful of
giving full consideration to lesser known, but highly qualified judicial
Ultimately, a commission should screen and select
candidates.
candidates consistent with the goal described above.
Unless altered by state law or custom, the chairperson should
normally submit an alphabetical list of the judicial nominees to the
appointing authority. Unless altered by custom or state law, the list of
nominees should contain only the names of the nominees without
reference to political affiliation or commission preference.
Once the candidate names have been submitted, some states permit
the appointing authority to contact and consult individual commissioners
regarding the judicial nominees. At all times in the selection process,
however, nominating commissions and commissioners should avoid
"lobbying" appointing authorities in favor of particular judicial
candidates. Many states require individual commissioners to disclose to
the full commission any communication either with the appointing
authority or as to private communication with judicial candidates.
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Standard B.3: Appointin2 Authority. The primary goal of
individuals or official bodies who are responsible for judicial
appointments should be a qualified, inclusive, and independent
judiciary.
(a) Open. Regularized Process. In making appointments to the
judiciary, the appointing authority should use an open, regularized
process to review the qualifications of judicial candidates. The
appointing authority should appoint only from lists of qualified
candidates submitted by the Judicial Eligibility Commission (see
Standard B.1) or a Judicial Nominating Commission (see Standard
B.2).
(b) Selection. In reviewing the qualifications of candidates
submitted by the Judicial Eligibility Commission or Judicial
Nominating Commission, the appointing authority should consider a
broad range of publicly disclosed selection criteria (see Part A). The
appointing authority should select for judicial office only those
individuals deemed qualified by the Judicial Eligibility Commission
or Judicial Nominating Commission.
(c) Use of Judicial Nominating Commission and Judicial
Eligibility Commission. The appointing authority should establish
or assist in the establishment of either a Judicial Eligibility
Commission (See Standard B.1) or a Judicial Nominating
Commission (See Standard B.2).
Commentary
In the vast majority of American jurisdictions, chief executive
branch officials have the authority to fill judicial vacancies by an
appointment method. In four states (California, Maine, New Hampshire
and New Jersey), the basic judicial selection system is solely
gubernatorial appointment. In the twenty-five states employing a "merit
plan" for judicial selection, the governor appoints from a list of persons
chosen by a Judicial Nominating Commission. Even in the twenty-one
states where the basic selection method is a partisan or nonpartisan
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election, the governor often appoints individuals to fill interim vacancies
occurring between elections. In sum, appointment accounts for the initial
selection of many judges in the United States.
The appointing authority should respect the value of an independent
judiciary in the selection process. An independent judiciary is essential
to the consistent application of the law in a democratic society. There
are many influences in the selection process that could compromise the
candidate's independence when he or she reaches the bench. It is
important that the election process be geared toward minimizing, if not
eliminating, these compromising influences. For this reason, the
appointing authority should respect judicial independence, even though it
may come at some political costs. The temptation to "repay" campaign
contributors or the party faithful with judgeships should be resisted.
Downplaying such political considerations reinforces the perception of
an independent and highly qualified judiciary.
Although appointing authorities will necessarily rely on numerous
factors when selecting judges, their ultimate goal should be a qualified,
inclusive, and independent judiciary. Typically, executive branch
officials will seek candidates who share similar political philosophies.
For this reason, the appointing authority often consults, or is pressured
by, individuals who were influential in the appointing authority's
election to office. These influences may include political parties, other
public officials, and influential private interests. Appointing authorities
also confer with bar leaders in selecting qualified candidates. Although
an appointing authority may therefore be subject to numerous influences
and pressures when selecting judges, the appointing authority's selection
should rest primarily on the qualifications of the candidate. The
appointing authority can best insure that a particular candidate is
qualified for judicial office by using a Judicial Eligibility Commission
(see Standard B.1) or a Judicial Nominating Commission (see Standard
B.2).
An open, regularized process for the appointment of judges
promotes objectivity by reducing the influence of inappropriate political
pressures, and thereby adds legitimacy to the outcome. The use of an
open, regularized process heightens the likelihood of achieving the goals
of a qualified, inclusive, and independent judiciary. An open selection
process will assist in the recruitment of a diverse candidate pool, thereby
promoting the goal of achieving a judiciary that is representative of our
society particularly in terms of race, ethnicity, gender, and age or other
indicia of diversity.
If appointing authorities adhere to high standards regarding the
judicial selection process, those responsible for confirming executive
branch judicial appointees, usually legislative officials, will also be
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encouraged to adopt high standards. The confirming body should make
every effort to achieve the goals of a qualified, inclusive and independent
judiciary above partisanship and other irrelevant considerations.
The use of a Judicial Eligibility or a Judicial Nominating
Commission assists the appointing authority in maintaining an open,
regularized judicial selection process. In selecting members for either
commission, the appointing authority should choose individuals of
diverse backgrounds who are committed to the goals of achieving a
qualified, inclusive, and independent judiciary.
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Standard B.4: Endorsin2 Authority. The primary goal of
individuals or official bodies who are responsible for endorsing
judicial candidates for election should be to facilitate the selection of
a qualified, inclusive, and independent judiciary.
(a) Open. Regularized Process.
In endorsing judicial
candidates, the endorsing authority should use an open, regularized
process to review the qualifications of judicial candidates. The
endorsing authority should endorse only those candidates who
appear on lists of qualified candidates submitted by the Judicial
Eligibility Commission (see Standard B.1).
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(b) Selection. In reviewing the qualifications of candidates
submitted by a Judicial Eligibility Commission, the endorsing
authority should consider a broad range of publicly disclosed
selection criteria (see Part A).
(c) Use of a Judicial Eligibility Commission. The endorsing
authority should encourage the use of a Judicial Eligibility
Commission (see Standard B.1).
Commentary
Endorsing authorities usually play key roles in states that employ
partisan or nonpartisan judicial election systems. An example of an
endorsing authority is a political party slatemaking committee. A party
slatemaking committee selects the judicial candidate who will represent
the party in an upcoming judicial election. In many ways, a slatemaking
committee is as influential as an appointing authority. Hence, similar to
appointing authorities, endorsing authorities should select judicial
candidates in a manner that brings legitimacy to the selection process and
promotes the selection of a qualified, inclusive, and independent
judiciary.
In an effort to formalize the process of endorsing judicial
candidates, a Judicial Eligibility Commission (see Standard B.1) should
be utilized by endorsing authorities. Through the use of an Eligibility.
Commission, members of the public and the bar can be further included
in the process of deciding judicial candidate endorsements. The use of
such a commission brings legitimacy to the endorsement process, and
adds validity to the judicial selection process in general.
While it is understandable that an endorsing authority will consider
factors such as party loyalty in making an endorsement, it is not
inconsistent to also facilitate the selection of a qualified, inclusive, and
independent judiciary. To promote this goal, endorsing authorities
should abide by the findings of an Eligibility Commission.
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Standard B.5: Retention Evaluation Body.
A retention
evaluation body should operate in a manner that is consistent with
the goal of achieving and maintaining a qualified, inclusive, and
independent judiciary.
(a) Evaluation Methodology. A retention evaluation body
should review judges based on the criteria set forth in Part A, and
operate in a fair, efficient, confidential and logical manner.
(b) Dissemination.
A retention evaluation body should
disseminate evaluation results as broadly as possible and in a
manner that educates the citizenry about the judicial candidates.
Commentary
Some states with judicial retention elections have established
retention evaluation bodies, by statute or constitutional provision, that
conduct surveys of those persons with direct knowledge of judges subject
to retention. The results of these surveys are intended to aid voters in
judicial retention elections. These states are Alaska, Arizona, Colorado,
New Mexico, Tennessee, and Utah. Moreover, the state of Oklahoma
has established an ad hoc body to perform this role. State formalization
of the retention evaluation process adds legitimacy to the body's
recommendations and allows the use of state funds to assist in
researching candidates and disseminating the results. These bodies serve
the direct purpose of educating the citizenry about judicial candidates
facing retention. This trend of states to fund retention evaluation bodies
is applauded. Such bodies should receive full and adequate funding and
should utilize sound survey methods.
The American Judicature Society has recently published the first
full report of four states that fund retention evaluation bodies. The report
examines in detail the different versions of the retention evaluation
bodies. Recommendations for establishing a state retention evaluation
body are included in the report and should be consulted by persons
interested in, or involved with, retention evaluation bodies.
Retention evaluations should occur in an objective environment,
free from partisan or ideological interests. Evaluators should direct
surveys at those persons with first-hand knowledge of the judge. Bodies
should phrase questions with the goal of producing critical, specific, nonredundant responses from those polled. If the polling community is too
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large, random sampling should be utilized. At all times in the evaluating
process, the identities of those polled should be kept confidential and
anonymous comments should not be considered.
After the body has evaluated the candidates, the results should be
disseminated to as large a voting audience as reasonably possible.
Evaluators and others interested in judicial selection are encouraged to
pool their resources in an attempt to effectively disseminate evaluation
survey results. Results should be presented in an easy to understand
logical form.
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Part C: Supporting Actors in Selection Process
Standard C.1: Bar Associations.
State and local bar
associations should place a high priority on facilitating the selection
and retention of a qualified, inclusive, and independent judiciary.
(a) Assisting Appointing Authority and Endorsing Authority.
Bar associations should assist the appointing authority and
endorsing authority by encouraging the use of a Judicial Eligibility
Commission (see Standard B.1) or Judicial Nominating Commission
(See Standard B.2), and should assist such commission by
conducting appropriate investigation and inquiry of their members
and with their communities to review the qualifications of judicial
candidates.
(b) Selection of Members of Judicial Eligibility Commission or
Judicial Nominating Commission.
Where bar associations are
responsible for the selection of members of a Judicial Eligibility
Commission or Judicial Nominating Commission, bar associations
should operate in a manner that is independent of the appointing or
endorsing authorities, with the goal of producing a qualified,
inclusive, and independent judiciary. When making appointments to
a Commission, bar associations should be mindful of the goal of
achieving a commission that is independent and inclusive.
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(c) Service to the Law. Bar associations should encourage their
members to assist in the judicial selection process by serving on a
Judicial Eligibility Commission or a Judicial Nominating
Commission, and educating the electorate about the process of
judicial selection.
(d) Endorsement of Candidates. Bar association endorsement
of judicial candidates should reflect the goal of achieving a qualified,
inclusive, and independent judiciary.
(e) Educational Programs in Ethics for Candidates. Bar
associations should provide educational programs in ethics and
judicial standards to candidates who must be held to such standards
during any judicial election. This program shall also include state
laws on financing judicial campaigns and disclosures.
Commentary
Public officials, media interests, and others often rely on bar
associations to assist in monitoring, evaluating, and selecting judicial
candidates and sitting judges. For this reason, bar associations play an
important role in the judicial selection process.
Commonly, bar
associations may be more influential in elective states than in appointive
jurisdictions, however, their role in appointive states can be significant.
There are two main ways bar associations help executive branch
officials appoint judges. One way bar associations assist an appointing
authority is by informing the authority about the judicial nominees.
Appointing authorities inquire about the potential judicial candidates and
their qualifications and often bar associations respond through polls of
their members or personal advice of bar leaders. Thus bar associations,
and their representatives, have an obligation to be fair and thorough
when discussing judicial nominees and their qualifications.
Bar associations also assist in the judicial selection process through
the selection of judicial nominating commissioners and judicial
eligibility commissioners. In many jurisdictions, state, or occasionally
local, bar association leaders are directly responsible for the selection of
commissioners. Even where bar associations are not directly responsible
for the selection of commissioners, bar leaders are often consulted by
appointing authorities to aid them in their commission appointments. In
appointive jurisdictions where nominating commissions are not
employed, bar associations should advocate the voluntary use of
nominating commissions by the appointing authority. In states that do
not yet have a Judicial Eligibility Commission, bar associations should
encourage its implementation.
Whether nominating commissions are statutory or voluntary, bar
associations should select commission members based solely on the
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independent judgment of the association member and not based on the
judgment of public officials or political interests.
In many appointive jurisdictions, bar associations are responsible
for evaluating judicial candidates and sitting judges subject to retention
elections. This evaluation often takes the form of bar polls. The purpose
of these polls is ultimately to inform the citizenry about the judicial
candidates.
The polls serve a second function by helping judges
determine their own performance.
To that end, "Guidelines for
Reviewing Qualifications of Candidates for State Judicial Offices"
published by the American Bar Association should be consulted and
followed.
Bar associations are influential when deciding whether to endorse a
judicial candidate in either a retention or general judicial election. A
state or local bar association is in the unique position of "rating" a judge
as qualified or not.
Sometimes media endorsements follow bar
association endorsements. When endorsing judges running for retention,
bar associations should be mindful of their primary educational role. Bar
associations should decide to endorse solely on the qualifications of the
judicial candidates. Bar associations should bear in mind the objectives
of producing a highly qualified, inclusive, and independent judiciary.
After a bar poll is conducted, the results should be disseminated to as
broad an audience as possible. In states that utilize judicial elections for
initial appointments, bar associations can be helpful in creating Judicial
Eligibility Commissions.
Bar associations should also provide educational programs in ethics
and judicial standards to judicial candidates. These programs should
address various ethical canons governing the election and campaign
process, including state laws on financing judicial campaigns and
disclosures. Bar associations might consider partnering with other
organizations to provide such educational programs.
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Standard C.2: Judicial Candidates. Judicial candidates should
conduct themselves in a manner that brings legitimacy to the judicial
selection process and maintains the integrity of an independent
judiciary.
(a) Disclosure. Judicial candidates should disclose all real or
potential conflicts of business or personal interest related to a
Judicial Eligibility Commission, Judicial Nominating Commission,
endorsing authority, appointing authority, media outlet, or other
relevant entity.
(b) Election Campaigns. Judicial candidates should comply
with state law and ethical rules governing the selection of judges, and
should act in a manner that brings legitimacy to the selection
process. Judicial candidates in elective jurisdictions should comply
with all relevant judicial ethics rules governing campaign activities.
(c) Judicial Eligibility Commission or Judicial Nominating
Commission. Judicial candidates should supply information to a
Judicial Eligibility Commission (see Standard B.1) or Judicial
Nominating Commission (see Standard B.2) as required by law or
rules of the appropriate commission.
(d) Confidentiality.
A judicial candidate should keep
confidential those Judicial Eligibility Commission or Judicial
Nominating Commission activities that the commissioners would
themselves be required to keep confidential.
Commentary
In appointive plan jurisdictions, the judicial candidate is usually a
person interested in becoming a judge who must appear before a judicial
commission or appointing authority, or is a sitting judge who must
succeed in a retention election. In elective states, judicial candidates are
usually attorneys or sitting judges who wish to be placed on a judicial
ballot for selection by vote. Judicial candidates are subject to certain
rules and customs associated with judicial selection. The American Bar
Association Model Code of Judicial Conduct, which has been adopted in
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some form in every state, regulates the conduct of judicial candidates. In

particular, a judicial candidate should be aware of all relevant judicial
ethics provisions in his or her jurisdiction and adhere strictly to them.
Every judicial selection process requires a fair inquiry concerning
the qualities and characteristics of the judicial candidates. In presenting
himself or herself to the appointing official or evaluating body, the
judicial candidate should respond to all inquiries truthfully and supply
any and all information relevant to his or her candidacy for judicial
office. At all times prior to selection, judicial candidates should
cooperate with Judicial Nominating Commissions (see Standard B.2) and
Judicial Eligibility Commissions (see Standard B. 1).
Pursuant to the dictates of the Model Code of Judicial Conduct
Canon I and Canon 4, judicial candidates should take steps to minimize
the risk of conflict with judicial obligations. Additionally, these
standards urge judicial candidates to avoid any personal or business
related conflict of interest that may inappropriately affect the selection
process. If a real conflict or a potential conflict of interest exists between
a judicial candidate and a nominating commission, appointing authority,
endorsing authority, eligibility commission, or media interest, the
judicial candidate should take the necessary steps to disclose such a
conflict to those responsible for judicial selection or review. If
disclosure of a substantial conflict cannot diminish the ill effects of the
controversy, or if disclosure is not a reasonable option, the judicial
candidate should withdraw from the selection process.
Usually judges who reach office in an appointive plan jurisdiction
are required to take part in a retention election within a specified number
of years after reaching the bench. A retention election judicial candidate
has no competing judicial candidate(s), but instead must secure an
"approval" by receiving a positive vote by at least a majority of voters.
Canon 5 of the Model Code of Judicial Conduct regulates the activities
of judicial retention election candidates. The judge who is going before
the voters in a retention election should become familiar with the
relevant judicial ethics provisions in his or her jurisdiction and comply
with them. Judges facing retention should cooperate with state
authorized evaluation bodies responsible for reviewing judicial
candidates.
In most jurisdictions employing Judicial Nominating or Judicial
Eligibility Commissions, certain discussions, findings, and research
conducted by the commissions will be held confidential for the benefit of
the judicial candidates and the selection procedure. Judicial candidates,
whether successful or not, should abide by the jurisdiction's rules
governing the confidentiality of the selection process and the work of the
commissions.
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Standard C.3: Individual Attorneys. Consistent with their
obligations under the Model Rules of Professional Conduct,
attorneys should use their special knowledge of, and professional
interest in, the judicial system to legitimize the judicial selection
process and assist in achieving the goal of a qualified, inclusive, and
independent judiciary.
Commentary
Attorneys have a strong professional interest in the judicial selection
process and possess special knowledge about the judicial system and
judicial candidates. It is for this reason that Judicial Nominating and
Eligibility Commissions should have lawyer members. Attorneys also
act as references for judicial candidates. Often, individual attorneys are
consulted by appointing officials or polled by bar associations
concerning judicial candidates.
Additionally, attorneys may be
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contacted, or may even contact, media sources regarding judicial
candidates. Thus, individual attorneys and law firms have a tremendous
amount of power to influence the judicial selection process.
This special knowledge attorneys have about judicial candidates
brings with it certain responsibilities. When lawyers are involved either
directly or indirectly in judicial selection, they should conduct
themselves in a manner that brings legitimacy and respect to the
selection process. If an attorney knows of information that could be
relevant to an evaluating commission or an appointing authority, the
attorney should disclose such information. Ultimately, lawyers should
place the legal system on a higher footing than either personal feelings or
personal loyalties to other individuals.
In short, attorneys should seek to bring legitimacy to the judicial
selection process by maintaining high standards of conduct in every
aspect of their involvement in the process. In addition, they should insist
that others conduct themselves in a manner that seeks to achieve the goal
of a qualified, inclusive, and independent judiciary.
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Standard C.4: Public and Private Organizations. Public and
private organizations which take public positions regarding the
selection or election of judicial candidates should respect the desired
goal of producing a qualified, inclusive, and independent judiciary.
Commentary
In a variety of ways, different private and public organizations
influence the judicial selection process. While their impact on judicial
selection varies greatly, these organizations should respect the goals of
the selection process and not allow their particular interest or point of
view to interfere with the goal of achieving a qualified, inclusive and
independent judiciary. Organizations associated with particular issues
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and citizen groups can play a decisive role in deciding who should, or
should not, be a judge. Of the various supporting actors affecting
judicial selection, these groups may be the most unpredictable. The
unpredictability of these groups makes their influence on the selection
process difficult to measure. The large differences between these groups
also make their influence difficult to assess.
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Standard C.5: Media Interests. The appointment and election
of qualified judges is crucial to the administration of a sound justice
system and the media are encouraged to make increased efforts to
advise the public as to the qualifications of candidates for judicial
office.
Commentary
Newspapers, magazines, television programs, Internet sites, radio
programs, and other media sources together represent the large group of
media interests. Collectively, this group can have an enormous impact
on the selection of judges. Polls show that in our society voters receive
candidate information mostly from some form of media service, and not
from personal knowledge or personal contact with the candidates
themselves. Americans trust the media to deliver candidate information
in a fair and neutral manner. For these reasons, media interests should
balance the coverage of judicial elections and campaigns in order to
foster a democratic process.
In addition to standard "news articles," media sources educate the
citizenry about the process of judicial selection and judicial candidates
through the standard editorial or "op-ed" piece. A media group's
decision to endorse or oppose a judicial candidate should rest primarily
on the judicial capacity of the candidate, and not on any special
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relationship which exists between the media group and the judicial
candidate. Media sources should also inform the public of any real or
potential conflicts of interest related to business or personal associations
with the judicial selection procedures, judicial candidates, or any other
conflicts that may unduly influence the decision of the media group to
endorse a judicial candidate.
Although the judicial selection process normally will generate less
media interest in appointive jurisdictions than in elective jurisdictions,
the press has an important role to play in educating the citizenry and
insuring an open and fair process. Appointing authorities, endorsing
authorities, judicial nominating and eligibility commissioners, and others
responsible for judicial appointments will be more likely to maintain
high standards of conduct if they know their actions may be the subject
of press coverage. In addition, judges facing elections are sometimes the
targets of interest groups that may be unfairly critical of a judge's
handling of certain cases. The media can play an important role not only
in presenting fair coverage of candidates and substantive issues, but also
in broadening their coverage to educate the public about the importance
of maintaining the independence of the judiciary.
Lastly, media interests are encouraged to publish findings produced
by the primary actors and bar associations.
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